

Security Boot Camp Oracle Database Security Vulnerabilities Explained

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About Integrigy



Integrigy Published Security Alerts

Security Alert	Versions	Security Vulnerabilities
Critical Patch Update April 2012	11.5.10 – 12.1.x	Oracle E-Business Suite security architecture issue
Critical Patch Update July 2011	11.5.10 – 12.1.x	 Oracle E-Business Suite security configuration issue
Critical Patch Update October 2010	11.5.10 – 12.1.x	2 Oracle E-Business Suite security weaknesses
Critical Patch Update July 2008	Oracle 11g 11.5.8 – 12.0.x	2 Issues in Oracle RDBMS Authentication2 Oracle E-Business Suite vulnerabilities
Critical Patch Update April 2008	12.0.x 11.5.7 – 11.5.10	• 8 vulnerabilities, SQL injection, XSS, information disclosure, etc.
Critical Patch Update July 2007	12.0.x 11.5.1 – 11.5.10	• 11 vulnerabilities, SQL injection, XSS, information disclosure, etc.
Critical Patch Update October 2005	11.0.x, 11.5.1 - 11.5.10	Default configuration issues
Critical Patch Update July 2005	11.0.x, 11.5.1 – 11.5.10	 SQL injection vulnerabilities and Information disclosure
Critical Patch Update April 2005	11.0.x, 11.5.1 – 11.5.10	 SQL injection vulnerabilities and Information disclosure
Critical Patch Update Jan 2005	11.0.x, 11.5.1 – 11.5.10	SQL injection vulnerabilities
Oracle Security Alert #68	Oracle 8i, 9i, 10g	Buffer overflowsListener information leakage
Oracle Security Alert #67	11.0.x, 11.5.1 – 11.5.8	10 SQL injection vulnerabilities
Oracle Security Alert #56	11.0.x, 11.5.1 – 11.5.8	 Buffer overflow in FNDWRR.exe
Oracle Security Alert #55	11.5.1 – 11.5.8	 Multiple vulnerabilities in AOL/J Setup Test Obtain sensitive information (valid session)
Oracle Security Alert #53	10.7, 11.0.x 11.5.1 – 11.5.8	 No authentication in FNDFS program Retrieve any file from O/S





Oracle Critical Patch Updates

Fixes for security bugs in all Oracle products

- Released quarterly on a fixed schedule
- Tuesday closest to the **17th** day of January, April, July and October
- Next CPUs = July 17, 2012 and October 16, 2012

Thirty CPUs released to date starting with January 2005

- **1,379** security bugs fixed (average is 47 bugs per CPU)
- **433** bugs in the Oracle Database
- **236** bugs in the Oracle E-Business Suite

Oracle Security Bugs per Quarter



Oracle Security Bug Process

Bug reported

Elapsed time on average is 18 months

> Bug fixed

- 1. Customer or security researcher reports security bug to Oracle
- Oracle researches bug and develops bug fix
 Finder not allowed to test fix or even notified about fix
- Oracle may first include fix in new releases
 No notification of security fixes to customers
- 4. Oracle includes fix in quarterly CPU
 - From initial report to security patch release is 3 months to 3 years

Oracle Security Bug Process

Vulnerability may be fixed first in a new version (e.g., 11.2.0.2) before through a Critical Patch Update with no notification



Critical Patch Updates Baselines

Database Version Upgrade Patch	Included CPU
10.2.0.4	April 2008
10.2.0.5	October 2010
11.1.0.6	October 2007
11.1.0.7	January 2009
11.2.0.1	January 2010
11.2.0.2	January 2011
11.2.0.3	July 2011

At time of release. usually the latest available **CPU** is included

Database CPU Support

Database Version	Terminal CPU
10.1.0.5	January 2012 (b)
10.2.0.4	July 2011 (a)(c)
10.2.0.5	July 2013 (b)
11.1.0.7	July 2015 (b)
11.2.0.1	July 2011 (a)
11.2.0.2	January 2013 (a)
11.2.0.3	July 2014 (d)

(a) Oracle CPU Support Date(c) Supported only on limited platforms

(b) Oracle Lifetime Support Date

(d) Estimated by Integrigy





Oracle Database Vulnerability Breakdown

~40% SQL Injection

~20% Buffer Overflow

~10% Privilege or Permission Issue

~30% Other

Total Vulnerabilities = 433

% of Bugs Exploitable with No Auth



For the CPUs January 2007 through January 2012 (47 of 253 database bugs)

% of Bugs PUBLIC Exploitable



For the CPUs January 2007 through January 2012 (133 of 253 database bugs)

% of Published Exploits PUBLIC Exploitable



For the CPUs January 2007 through January 2012 (59 of 133 database bugs)

Who can exploit a PUBLIC bug?

Anyone with a database account

Remember those application accounts with generic passwords such as APPLSYSPUB/PUB in Oracle E-Business Suite





Oracle Security Bug Walkthrough

SQL Injection

January 2009 – MDSYS.SDO_TOPO_DROP_FTBL Trigger (CVE-2008-3979)

April 2010 – Java Public Privilege on DBMS_JVM_EXP_PERMS (CVE-2010-0867)

Design Flaw

January 2012 – Oracle SCN Escalation (CVE-2012-0082)

SQL Injection – SDO_TOPO_DROP_FTBL

Vuln #	Component	Protocol	Package and/or Privilege Required	Remote Exploit without Auth.?
CVE-2008-3979	Oracle Spatial	Oracle Net	Drop Table, Create Procedure	No

CVSS VERSION 2.0 RISK						Last Affected	
Base Score	Access Vector	Access Complexity	Authentication	Confidentiality	Integrity	Availability	Patch set (per Supported Release)
5.5	Network	Low	Single	Partial+	Partial+	None	10.1.0.5, 10.2.0.2

Privilege Issue – DBMS_JVM_EXP_PERMS

Vuln #	Component	Protocol	Package and/or Privilege Required	Remote Exploit without Auth.?
CVE-2010-0867	Java VM	Oracle Net	Create Session	No

CVSS VERSION 2.0 RISK						Last Affected	
Base Score	Access Vector	Access Complexity	Authentication	Confidentiality	Integrity	Availability	Patch set (per Supported Release)
4.0	Network	Low	Single	None	Partial+	None	10.2.0.4, 11.1.0.7, 11.2.0.1.0

Design Flaw – Oracle SCN

Vuln #	Component	Protocol	Package and/or Privilege Required	Remote Exploit without Auth.?
CVE-2012-0082	Core RDBMS	Oracle Net	Create Session	No

CVSS VERSION 2.0 RISK						Last Affected	
Base Score	Access Vector	Access Complexity	Authentication	Confidentiality	Integrity	Availability	Patch set (per Supported Release)
5.5	Network	Low	Single	None	Partial	Partial+	10.1.0.5, 10.2.0.5, 11.1.0.7, 11.2.0.3

Oracle Database SCN

System Change Number (SCN)

A database ordering primitive. The value of an SCN is the logical point in time at which changes are made to a database.

Internal Timestamp

SCNs order events within the database, which is necessary for redo and read consistency

* 281 Trillion Limit

48-bit number – 500 year limit – *immaterial for this discussion*

& Current Maximum SCN

Database cannot exceed "time-based rationing system" for SCNs which is recalculated every second = seconds since 1988 * 16384

ORA-600 errors occur if the Current Maximum SCN is exceeded

SCN Illustrated



- 281 trillion upper limit will not be reached for 500 years – this limit really doesn't matter
- Current Maximum SCN increases +16,384 every second
- Current SCN increases +1 with most changes
- Current SCN cannot exceed Current Maximum SCN – otherwise ORA-600 [2252] for any changes

SCN Increments



Each database change

- Transaction commits
- Transactions within same second may have same SCN



Distributed transactions – database links

Synchronizes local and remote databases to highest SCN



Software bugs

- ALTER DATABASE BEGIN BACKUP doesn't turn off
- How many more issues exist?

"However, Oracle has determined that some software bugs could cause the database to exceed the current maximum SCN value."

"All the associated bugs have been fixed in the January 2012 CPU (and associated PSU)."

Oracle Bulletin, 17 January 2012

Design Flaw vs. Software Bug

Known software bugs are fixed in the January 2012 Critical Patch Update

Any new bugs still can cause errors when the current maximum SCN is exceeded

"But with steadfast consistency, Oracle has characterized the risk posed by these problems as **minimal**."

InfoWorld, January 23, 2012

January 2012 Critical Patch Update



Known SCN escalation bugs fixed

- ALTER DATABASE BEGIN BACKUP fixed
- One or more other bugs fixed



Database Link SCN Sanity Check

- Database links from remote databases where the remote SCN is within <x> of the Current Maximum SCN will be rejected
- Hidden parameter <u>external_scn_rejection_threshold_hours</u> added for 10g and 11.1 with a default of 24 hours

SCN Flaw State after Jan 2012 CPU

Fundamental flaw will always exist

- January 2012 CPU fixes bugs, but not the fundamental flaw
- It is still possible to stop database processing if SCN can be made to exceed Current Maximum SCN



Database link risk still exists

- Window of exceeding the Current Maximum SCN has been minimized to a few hours
- Worst-case scenario is database will be unavailable for several hours
- Must have a window for SCNs due to time zone differences and clock discrepancies

Database Link Case Study



Overview

- Organization with about 150 production Oracle Databases
- Integrigy assessed 15 key SOX and PCI compliance Oracle databases
- Reviewed database links for connectivity and appropriateness

Conclusion

Database links are widely used in most organizations

Example SCN Current State

Current Maximum SCN = 12,691,246,776,320

Instance	Version	Current SCN
Database A	10.2.0.5	8,399,825,495,842
Database B	10.1.0.4	5,965,078,978,284
Database C	10.2.0.4	8,399,825,745,153
Database D	10.2.0.4	8,399,826,124,718
Database E	9.2.0.7	8,399,825,011,234
Database F	10.2.0.4	8,399,826,360,924

Risk: Single Database

Limited risk to a single database

- Difficult to escalate the SCN beyond the Current Maximum SCN without DBA privileges - must set init parameters and bounce database
- Possible to crash a database with a directed attack (google: gokan atil scn)

2

Databases near Current Maximum SCN most at risk

- It is possible to increase the SCN rate per second with low overhead transactions, but to exceed a rate of 16,384 per second is difficult
- Must sustain for a long period to catch up to Current Maximum SCN

Risk: Interconnected Databases



- Requires a triggering event (such as ALTER DATABASE BACKUP bug) for escalated SCN rate on a high transaction volume database
- Will cascade through all interconnected databases

Malicious attack is feasible, but practical?

- Only requires access to a database account with CREATE SESSION on at least one database
- January 2012 CPU reduce possible impact
- No known attack methods that would require databases to be rebuilt (export/import)





Contact Information

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