Webinar on fraud risks in Oracle E-Business Suite procure-to-pay, such as fictitious suppliers and bank accounts, and the anti-fraud policies, application controls monitoring and IT security controls that guard against them.
Guarding against fraud in Oracle E-Business Suite (EBS) takes action on several fronts: within the ERP applications, in written policies and procedures, and in IT security. These slides from ERP Risk Advisors and Integrigy cover fraud risks in the procure-to-pay process, anti-fraud policies and procedures, meaningful monitoring within the applications, monitoring for IT security, secure passwords and guarding access to data.
Fraud prevention and detection need well-designed processes and controls, monitoring of sub-material fraud risks and non-key controls, and closing known back-door loopholes. Auditors and EBS teams can then find the weaknesses that would give a fraudster a foothold.
Key Points
- A fictitious supplier, or a fictitious bank account for a fictitious or valid supplier, is one of the most significant procure-to-pay fraud risks: the supplier can be paid through POs with two-way match or invoices within approval limits, and the bank account lets ACH transactions be re-routed, circumventing other controls.
- Base policies on risk: validate all supplier adds and changes (such as EIN verification or third-party checks), verify bank account adds and changes by secure fax and call-back, verify ACH file amounts, set a protocol for wires, use positive pay for all checks, and audit 100% of bank and supplier adds and changes before payment.
- Monitor key application controls, both those automated by configuration, such as the Payables option allowing address changes, PO Line Types and PO Document Types, and those set by policy, such as supplier or bank account changes without approved paperwork and overrides of matching requirements when entering a purchase order.
- IT security below the application level is critical, as back-door access is often undetectable: direct database updates, seeded accounts, password resets and shared logins let data be updated outside policy, and over 30 forms that allow ad-hoc SQL, such as Alerts and Collection Plans, could update supplier addresses and bank accounts, possibly without a before/after audit trail.
- Anyone who can read
FND_USER, as APPS_READ accounts always can, in production or any clone whose passwords weren't changed during cloning, can follow procedures published on the Internet to decrypt the APPS password from a user with a known password, such as GUEST, then every other password, and log in to production as any user. - DBAs must use generic accounts for much maintenance (oracle and applmgr in the operating system, APPS, SYS and SYSTEM in the database, occasionally SYSADMIN in the application): monitoring that only named individuals use them is possible, monitoring their activity can be costly, and tying activity to the individual using a generic account is very difficult.
